Rejection Via Advice
We get status in part from the status of our associates, which is a credible signal of how others see us. Because of this, we prefer to associate with high status folks. But it looks bad to be overt about this. So we try to hide this motive, and to pretend that other motives dominate our choices of associates.
This would be easier to do if status were very stable. Then we could take our time setting up plausible excuses for wanting to associate with particular high status folks, and for rejecting association bids by particular low status folks. But in fact status fluctuates, which can force us to act quickly. We want to quickly associate more with folks who rise in status, and to quickly associate less with those who fall in status. But the coincidence in time between their status change and our association change may make our status motives obvious.
Since association seems a good thing in general, trying to associate with anyone seems a “nice” act, requiring fewer excuses. In contrast, weakening an existing association seems less nice. So we mainly need good excuses for pushing away those whose status has recently fallen. Such opportunistic rejection, just when our associates most need us, seems especially wrong and mean. So how do we manage it?
One robust strategy is to offer random specific advice. You acknowledge their problems, express sympathy, and then take extra time to “help” them by offering random specific advice about how to prevent or reverse their status fall. Especially advice that will sound good if quoted to others, but is hard for them to actually follow, and is unlikely to be the same as what other associates advise.
If different associates offer different advice, then this person with fallen status simply must fail to follow most of that advice. Which then gives all those folks whose advice was not followed an excuse to distance themselves from this failure. And those whose advice was followed, well at least they get the status mark of power – a credibly claim that they have influence over others. Either way, the falling status person loses even more status.
Unless of course the advice followed is actually useful. But what are the chances of that?
Added 27Dec: A similar strategy would be useful if your status were to rise, and you wanted to drop associates in order make room for more higher status associates.
There are reasons behind the thinking that it is reasonable for the rejection.
Hi Professor Hanson --
I have a comment unrelated to this post, but instead on your "Economic Growth Given Machine Intelligence" paper.
I've been playing around with the simplest version of the model, and it seems like most of the work in the model is done by the *assumption of a steady state*. Specifically, the assumption of a steady state means that interest rates are eventually constant. This causes wages to go to zero as time goes to infinity.
But perhaps there is no steady state for interest rates. Perhaps they increase forever, as for example wages do under the Solow model with exogenous technological growth. This makes intuitive sense as well: if the price of computer capital is falling faster than general technology level is rising, forever, (as is the case in the model), then it would make sense that the value of computers - the interest rate - will rise forever.
Then the result of the model would be that, instead of wages falling to zero as time goes to infinity, interest rates would go to infinity as time goes to infinity and wages would just be way lower - but not go to zero.
I hope that was clear. Do you have any thoughts on this? Thanks!