Might it be that coalitions serve a productive function? You often point out how they harm productivity, but certainly, they may elicit productivity from some sources that are not elicited by true evaluations or strict performance competition. Maybe coalitions increase morale due to familiarity or due to a feeling of increased job security (knowing that you are secure with even marginally lower output). Plausibly, many firms aren't the most fit for the current moment. But maybe coalitions give them intransigence and staying power in order to survive until times when they might be more fit. Schumpeter said that an instantaneously price & quantity adjusting market would be less stable and could wreak havoc. Might this 'stability' be a useful function of coalitions?
Your "grabber" theory of redistribution has some plausible ev-psych intuition, but evidence against it is that some people support taxing the rich more even if they don't expect to get more available to redistribute.
Might it be that coalitions serve a productive function? You often point out how they harm productivity, but certainly, they may elicit productivity from some sources that are not elicited by true evaluations or strict performance competition. Maybe coalitions increase morale due to familiarity or due to a feeling of increased job security (knowing that you are secure with even marginally lower output). Plausibly, many firms aren't the most fit for the current moment. But maybe coalitions give them intransigence and staying power in order to survive until times when they might be more fit. Schumpeter said that an instantaneously price & quantity adjusting market would be less stable and could wreak havoc. Might this 'stability' be a useful function of coalitions?
Your "grabber" theory of redistribution has some plausible ev-psych intuition, but evidence against it is that some people support taxing the rich more even if they don't expect to get more available to redistribute.