Many people are attracted to authority. They are eager to defend what authorities say against heretics who say otherwise. This lets them signal a willingness to conform, and gain status by associating with higher status authorities against lower status heretics.
Other people are tempted to be contrarians. My blog readers tend more this way. Contrarians are eager to find authorities with which they disagree, and to associate with similar others. In this way contrarians can affirm standard forager anti-dominance norms, bond more strongly to a group, and hope for glory later if their contrarian positions becomes standard.
I haven’t posted much on disagreement here lately, but contrarians should be disturbed by the basic result that knowing disagreement is irrational. That is, it is less accurate to knowingly disagree with others unless one has good reasons to think you are more rational than they in the sense of listening more to the info implicit in their opinions.
Today I want to point out a way that contrarians can stay contrarians, taking an authority defying position they can share with like-minded folks and which might later lead to glory, while avoiding most of the accuracy-reducing costs of disagreement: be contrarian on questions, not answers.
Academia has well known biases regarding the topics it studies. Academia is often literature-driven, clumping around a few recently-published topics and neglecting many others. Academia also prefers topics where one can show off careful mastery of difficult and thus impressive methods, and so neglects topics worse suited for such displays.
Of course academia isn’t the only possible audience when selling ideas, but the other possible customers also have known topic biases. For example, popular writings are biased toward topics which are easy to explain to their audience, which flatter that audience, and which pander to their biases.
The existence of these known topic biases suggests how to be a more accurate contrarian: disagree with academia, the popular press, etc. on what questions are worth studying. While individuals may at times disagree with you on the importance of the topics you champion, after some discussion they will usually cave and accept your claim that academia, etc. has these topic biases, and that one should expect your topic to be neglected as a result.
Some academics will argue that only standard difficult academic methods are informative, and all other methods give only random noise. But the whole rest of the world functions pretty well drawing useful conclusions without meeting standard academic standards of method or care. So it must be possible to make progress on topics not best suited for showing off mastery of difficult academic methods.
So if your topic has some initial or surface plausibility as an important topic, and is also plausibly neglected by recent topic fashion and not well suited for showing off difficult academic methods, you have a pretty plausible contrarian case for the importance of your topic. That is, you are less likely to be wrong about this emphasis, even though it is a contrarian emphasis.
Now your being tempted to be contrarian on questions suggests that you are the sort of person who is also tempted to be contrarian on answers. Because of this, for maximum accuracy you should probably bend over backwards to not be contrarian on which answers you favor to your contrarian question. Focus your enjoyment of defying authorities on defying their neglect of your questions, but submit to them on how to answer those questions. Try as far as possible to use very standard assumptions and methods, and be reluctant to disagree with others on answers to your questions. Resist the temptation to too quickly dismiss others who disagree on answers because they have not studied your questions as thoroughly as you. Once you get some others to engage your question in some detail, take what they say very seriously, even if you have studied far more detail than they.
With this approach, the main contrarian answer that you must endorse is a claim about yourself: that you don’t care as much about the rewards that attract others to the usual topics. Most people work on standard topics because those usually give the most reliable paths to academic prestige, popular press popularity, etc. And honestly, most people who think they don’t care much about such things are just wrong. So you’ll need some pretty strong evidence in support of your claim that you actually differ enough in your preferences to act differently. But fortunately, your being deluded about this can’t much infect the accuracy of your conclusions about your contrarian topic. Even if you are mistaken on why you study it, your conclusions are nearly as likely to be right.
This is the approach I’ve tried to use in my recent work on the social implications of brain emulations. This is very contrarian as a topic, in the sense that almost no one else works on it, or seems inclined that way. But it has an initial plausibility as very important, at least if one accepts standard conclusions in some tech and futurist worlds. It is plausibly neglected as having negative associations and being less well suited for impressive methods. And I try to use pretty standard assumptions and methods to infer answers to my contrarian question. Of course none of that protects me from delusions on the rewards I expect to forgo by focusing on this topic.
Added 7Mar: People are already in the habit of pleasantly tolerating a wider range of opinion on which questions are important, both because differing values contribute, and because people tend to strongly overestimate the importance of the questions they work on personally.
I believe a lot of contrarian positions, but I would not say I am the least biased toward them. I believe them based on the evidence. But when you find your first contrarian position to be proved by examination of the scientific literature, say, and especially if it is a very surprising contrarian position in the sense that all right thinking people think you are nuts, then that actually gives you strong evidence that your prior bias against contrarian positions was misplaced. And when you see your second contrarian position very surprisingly yet rationally proved, well then if you are rational you look for an explanation of what exactly you had been missing about the world. And this may well lead you to a rational theory that in fact combines very many more contrarian positions into a concise, and thus occam-friendly explanation.
When I realized that the "climate scientists" were delusional about the climate literature and the Pediatricians were delusional about the vaccine literature, I realized that had a larger import.Our normal expectation that these collections of individuals have determined their beliefs and practices by a logical, scientific process, is empirically proven wrong. Instead the observed facts are explained much better by the model espoused by Gustav Le Bon in his 1895 book The Crowd, the first work on group psychology, and arguably the most insightful. Although largely forgotten today, this work has had extraordinary influence. By their own accounts it was on Theodore Roosevelt’s bedside table, and dogeared by Mussolini. Lenin and Stalin took from it, and “Hitler’s indebtedness to Le Bon bordered on plagiarism” in the words of historian and Hitler-biographer Robert G. L. Waite. Sigmund Freud wrote a book discussing Le Bon, which we will quote from below, and Edward Bernays, the father of modern public relations, acknowledged his deep debt, as Goebbels did of Bernays’ reflected insights. So this wouldn’t be the first predictive power displayed by Le Bon’s model: every one of the above luminaries was very happy with their practical applications of Le Bon.
http://whyarethingsthisway....
Let me put it simpler. There is a fundamental bias that most people have which is simply wrong. If they encounter a question where the great majority confidently believes something, including typically government bodies and the like, and there is a small minority dissenting with arguments and links to scientific publications or data, their strong bias is the majority is right and the minority is wrong.In the real world, the opposite is far more often the case. The majority is invariably captive of crowd think. Crowds, even when they include the National Academy of Sciences, are incapable of logical thought.Its easy to understand why the majority are confused. They are certain they are right, precisely because of the bias we are discussing, and none of them has actually checked the logic, paying actual and specific attention to the holes the dissenters are pointing out in it. Instead they invariably argue about some strawman.Its not so easy to understand why the dissenters are dissenting, until you realize that they have checked the logic.
Another suspect assumption behind your advice to prefer contrarian questions: we should prefer to be correct.
Allow me a prediction-market analogy. Whether I speculate on one or another prediction depends on the comparison between my personal odds and that assigned by the prediction market. In other words, if I rationally believe the probability of having EMs is .1 but the market says it's .01, I should definitely invest in pro-EM predictions, despite my thinking they're unlikely.
The same logic should apply to contrarian views. If I have a well-reasoned opinion that causes me to predict at odds with the consensus, I should promote that opinion, even if I think it's unlikely. I shouldn't be trying to be correct; I should aim for the greatest possible marginal correctness (so to speak).
Where a marginal analysis might founder when applied to intellectual pursuits is in psychology rather than logic: it is hard to promote a view you believe is wrong. (Some will consider it intellectually dishonest; I think intellectual honesty lies in honest argument rather than sincere belief.) (To bridge the gap between value at the margin and truth, I've offered the distinction between opinion and belief. [See "The distinct functions of belief and opinion"--http://tinyurl.com/4r9k5g3 ])