It seems to me that philosophers mostly study questions where averaging is not a viable strategy for reducing error; this might account for their relative lack of interest in correlations between errors.
But on the other hand, surely major philosophical errors can also cause correlations? If, for example, I believe that I can predict th…
It seems to me that philosophers mostly study questions where averaging is not a viable strategy for reducing error; this might account for their relative lack of interest in correlations between errors.
But on the other hand, surely major philosophical errors can also cause correlations? If, for example, I believe that I can predict the future by looking at animal entrails, then averaging isn't going to help me recover (at least about statements about the future).
It seems to me that philosophers mostly study questions where averaging is not a viable strategy for reducing error; this might account for their relative lack of interest in correlations between errors.
But on the other hand, surely major philosophical errors can also cause correlations? If, for example, I believe that I can predict the future by looking at animal entrails, then averaging isn't going to help me recover (at least about statements about the future).